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The Europeanisation of the Transnistrian Conflict 
Marius Vahl* 
 
Introduction 
To describe the Transnistrian conflict as ‘frozen’ 
is becoming less and less appropriate. Although 
the conflict remains unresolved, there have been 
a number of significant and at times dramatic 
developments in recent years, both in the 
diplomatic efforts to negotiate a settlement, and 
in the underlying geopolitical alignments and 
political and economic structures sustaining the 
conflict. It is argued here that these changes are 
primarily because of the European Union.  
To begin with, the role of the EU was mainly 
reactive and of limited importance. It was thus 
more a case of Europeanisation rather than 
‘EU-isation’, owing more to the EU’s growing 
‘presence’ in the wider region rather than the 
EU as an actor engaging more in the 
Transnistrian conflict as such. But over the last 
two years, the EU has increasingly become 
directly involved. 
The effects of these changes go beyond 
Transnistria and the EU’s relations with 
Moldova, and will have a significant impact on 
the EU’s relations with other, larger Eastern 
neighbours. Cooperation on the Transnistrian 
conflict is an important test case of the 
credibility of the European aspirations of the 
new Ukrainian government. As a prominent 
element of the EU-Russian agenda for the 
‘overlapping near abroad’, the Transnistrian 
conflict has become a major issue of dispute, 
described by one prominent commentator as 
“the new frontline” in the strained relationship 
between the EU and Russia.
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* Marius Vahl is a Research Fellow at the Centre for 
European Policy Studies (CEPS), Brussels.  
1 See the article by Dov Lynch, “Shared Neighbourhood 
or New Frontline? The Crossroads in Moldova”, 
Russie.Cei.Visions No. 2, April 2005 (retrieved from 
http://www.ifri.org. 
The growing role of Europe and the EU 
Europeanisation in Moldova, Romania and 
Ukraine 
The dramatic change in the policy of the Communist 
government in Chisinau is the most important 
development related to the Transnistrian conflict in recent 
years. Elected in 2001 on a pro-Russian, anti-European 
programme and renewed efforts at reaching a negotiated 
settlement with Tiraspol, the government of President 
Vladimir Voronin has since completely changed 
Moldova’s foreign policy priorities. The Communist party 
and President Voronin were re-elected on a pro-EU, anti-
Russian platform and continued freeze in negotiations 
with Transnistria in March and April 2005. 
Moldova’s Western neighbour, Romania, is on track to 
become a member of the EU in less than two years. 
Romania has so far been a marginal actor as far as the 
Transnistrian conflict is concerned, as it focused virtually 
all of its foreign policy energy during the last decade on 
the formidable challenge of accession to the EU and 
NATO. Having joined NATO in 2004 and being set to 
accede to the EU in 2007, there are now signs that the 
new Romanian government is seeking to play a more 
active role in the Black Sea region more broadly and in 
the Moldovan and the Transnsitrian conflict in particular. 
It was not by accident that the new Romanian President 
Traian Basescu chose Chisinau as the destination of his 
first visit abroad following his inauguration in December 
2004. 
Moldova’s other direct neighbour, Ukraine, is even more 
important for the Transnistrian conflict on account of its 
border with Transnistria and its role as one of three 
mediators (together with Russia and the OSCE) in 
settlement negotiations. Following the Orange Revolution 
in late 2004, the prospects of enhanced cooperation 
between Chisinau and Kyiv are perhaps even greater than 
with Bucharest. Ukraine and Moldova agreed in early 
March to develop a joint proposal on border cooperation 
to be addressed to the EU.
2  
                                                      
2 Joint Declaration on Co-operation between Moldova and 
Ukraine, Kyiv, 1 March 2005, reprinted in European 
Newsletter, No. 2, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Moldova, 
2005, pp. 2-4 (retrieved from http://www.eurojournal.org).  
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The EU as an actor  
Since the beginning of 2003, the EU has taken a series of 
measures vis-à-vis Moldova and Transnistria. With some 
tweaking one can list 10 such initiatives: 
1.  In February 2003, the EU instituted a visa ban on the 
Transnistrian leadership. 
2.  In March 2003, the EU initiated and mediated 
negotiations between Moldova and Ukraine on 
customs and border agreements.  
3.  From spring 2003, there were internal discussions in 
the EU on a possible EU-led post-conflict ‘peace 
consolidation’ operation in Transnistria.  
4.  During 2003, the EU advised the Joint Constitutional 
Commission on a new constitution for a united 
Moldova. 
5.  In November 2003, EU High Representative Javier 
Solana intervened to advise the Moldovan 
government against accepting the so-called ‘Kozak 
memorandum’.  
6.  In February 2004, the visa ban on Transnistrian 
leaders was renewed. 
7.  From late 2003 to autumn 2004, the EU consulted and 
then negotiated a bilateral Action Plan with Moldova, 
as part of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP).  
8.  In August 2004, the visa ban was expanded to include 
additional Transnistrian leaders, and then renewed 
again for another year in February 2005. 
9.  In March 2005, an EU special representative to 
Moldova was appointed. 
10. In autumn 2005, a European Commission delegation 
will be established in Chisinau. 
Individually, most of these initiatives are relatively minor, 
with a limited impact on the evolution of the Transnistrian 
conflict. They often fall short of Moldovan expectations, 
and new initiatives, such as the recent appointment of the 
special representative, are typically described as “too 
little, very late, [and] inhibited by a Russia-first approach” 
by independent experts.
3 Combined, however, the set of 
EU initiatives over the last two years are exercising a 
significant impact on the development of the situation in 
Moldova and Transnistria.  
Is there an EU strategy towards the 
Transnistrian conflict? 
Indeed, what emerges looks almost like the beginning of a 
rather coherent plan. The growing EU engagement with 
Moldova can be described as the beginnings of a two-
pronged strategy:  
                                                      
3 Vladimir Socor, “European Union Puts a Toe in Moldova”, 
Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 2, Issue 28, 9 February 2005 
(retrieved from http://www.Jamestown.org). 
1.  The EU has gradually established itself as a key 
external actor in diplomatic efforts to resolve the 
Transnistrian conflict, as well as in a post-conflict 
settlement. While not (yet) a party in the ‘official’ 
negotiations, it has nonetheless become clear that it 
will be impossible to ignore the views of the EU when 
developing proposals for a settlement. 
2.  The EU is attempting to change the underlying 
economic, social and political structures that have 
allowed to conflict to remain frozen for more than a 
decade by upgrading its relations with Chisinau and 
by measures to prevent smuggling and trafficking. 
The EU and the diplomacy of the Transnistrian 
conflict 
The EU’s involvement in diplomatic efforts to solve the 
Transnistrian conflict has come about gradually, first by 
invitation and then later by its own initiatives. The EU 
was invited to be an observer providing expert advice in 
the Joint Constitutional Commission, a body established 
following a proposal by President Voronin in February 
2003.
4 This was the first time the EU participated 
officially in efforts to find a solution to the Transnistrian 
conflict.  
A possible post-conflict European security and defence 
policy operation in Transnistria was discussed by the 
EU’s Political and Security Committee on several 
occasions during 2003. Proposals were developed at the 
EU Institute for Security Studies in Paris in May 2003 and 
by the Dutch OSCE chairmanship in July 2003.
5 The 
latter called for an EU-led ‘peace consolidation force,’ in 
which no country would have more than 50% of the 
peacekeepers.  
The most dramatic instance of EU involvement was the 
intervention by EU High Representative Solana in late 
November 2003 advising President Voronin not to accept 
the Kozak memorandum, a plan for a constitutional 
settlement proposed by Russia. This proposal would give 
the Transnistrian side a de facto veto on constitutional 
changes in Moldova and thus perpetuate the Russian 
military presence for decades.
6 
The most recent EU initiative concerning the 
Transnistrian conflict was the appointment of Dutch 
                                                      
4 There was also an expert observer from the Venice 
Commission of the Council of Europe.  
5 Dov Lynch, Russia Faces Europe, Chaillot Paper No. 60, EU 
Institute for Security Studies, Paris, May 2003 and the OSCE 
“Food for Thought” (unpublished paper), July 2003.  
6 Although there were no specific provisions for external 
military presence in the text. See Michael Emerson and Marius 
Vahl, “Moldova and the Transnistrian Conflict”, in Bruno 
Coppieters et al., Europeanization and Conflict Resolution – 
Case Studies from the European Periphery, Ghent: Academia 
Press and the Journal of Ethnopoliticsa and Minorities in 
Europe, 2004, pp. 170-174 (retrieved from 
http://www.ecmi.de/jemie).  THE EUROPEANISATION OF THE TRANSNISTRIAN CONFLICT| 3 
diplomat Adriaan Jacobovits de Szeged as EU Special 
Representative for Moldova on 23 March 2005. His tasks 
will be four-fold:  
•  to “strengthen the EU’s contribution to the resolution 
of the Transnistrian conflict”;
 7   
•  to work on the EU’s contribution to an eventual 
settlement;  
•  to follow developments, cultivate contacts with the 
government in Chisinau and other domestic actors 
and offer EU advice and facilitation; and  
•  to assist in the development of EU policy towards 
Moldova and the region, in particular concerning 
conflict prevention and resolution.  
The EU and the economics of the Transnistrian 
conflict 
Trade and economics are vital aspects of the Transnistrian 
conflict. The EU has taken several initiatives during the 
last two years to change the underlying economic and 
political structures sustaining the conflict, and thus the 
incentives facing the two sides. These measures are 
perhaps more important for the future of the Transnistrian 
conflicts than its diplomatic efforts.  
Trade plays a crucial role in the Transnistrian economy, 
and the self-proclaimed government in Tiraspol relies 
heavily on export-oriented production for its budget.
8 As 
Transnistria is not recognised internationally, its 
producers require Moldovan customs stamps in order to 
sell their products legally on international markets. From 
the mid-1990s, customs stamps had been acquired by 
Transnistrian exporters through a special arrangement 
between the Moldovan government and the authorities in 
Tiraspol. Whether or not they were to be provided with 
such stamps and under what conditions has been one of 
the main sources of tension between Chisinau and 
Tiraspol in recent years. New customs stamps were 
introduced in September 2001, following Moldova’s 
accession to the WTO in July that year. Since then, the 
current Communist government has been more reticent in 
providing such stamps than previous Moldovan 
governments.  
Under an agreement reached in summer 2003, 
Transnistrian producers can now obtain such stamps if 
they register their companies in Chisinau. But companies 
registered there have to pay taxes to the Moldovan 
government. Considering that these companies already 
pay taxes to the Transnistrian authorities, this stipulation 
clearly reduces the ability of these firms to compete on 
international markets. Thus the new customs rules 
                                                      
7 Joint Action 23 March 2005, 7023/05 (Presse 53).  
8 See for instance the Research Paper on Transnistria, Center 
for Strategic Studies and Reforms, Chisinau, November 2003 
(retrieved from http://www.cisr-md.org).  
introduced by the Moldovan government have had a 
considerable negative economic impact on Transnistria.
9 
This accord followed the conclusion of an agreement 
between Moldova and Ukraine in May 2003 on customs 
and border controls along the Transnistrian section of the 
Moldovan-Ukrainian frontier.
10 This agreement was 
negotiated through the mediation of the European 
Commission, following an initiative by the then External 
Relations Commissioner Chris Patten in March that year. 
The basic aim is to allow Moldovan customs and border 
control personnel to be stationed on Ukrainian territory 
along the border with Transnistria, allowing the 
government in Chisinau to control movements across its 
eastern border. Although an additional agreement on 
customs and border control measures was reached in 
January 2004, the necessary measures were not 
introduced, mainly owing to a recalcitrant Kuchma 
regime. The blockade against Transnistria introduced by 
Chisinau in August 2004 following the crisis over the 
forceful closure of Romanian language schools in 
Transnistria in July was ineffective because of a lack of 
cooperation from Ukraine.
11 An international border 
monitoring mission, in which the European Union would 
likely play a predominant role, is also currently being 
discussed.
12 
The row between the previous Ukrainian government and 
Moldova over the issue stands in sharp contrast to the 
accommodating attitudes of the current Ukrainian 
government concerning cooperation to control trade 
between Transnistria and Ukraine. Reform of customs and 
border controls has been one of the main priorities of the 
new administration in Kyiv, and its efforts are already 
having an effect on the Transnistrian conflict. From late 
January 2005, the new Ukrainian government started to 
demand Moldovan customs stamps for imports into 
Transnistria, with exports expected to follow. Reports 
claim however that trade resumed in late March, 
following the meeting between President Viktor 
Yuschenko and Russian President Vladimir Putin.
13 It has 
been asserted that limited capacity is an important part of  
 
                                                      
9 See ibid., for an early assessment.  
10 For a more in-depth analysis, see George Dura, “EU Border 
Guards and Moldova’s Economic Integration”, April 2004, and 
“Prospects for Establishing an International Monitoring-Mission 
on the Ukraine-Moldova Border”, April 2005 (retrieved from 
http://www.eurojournal.org). 
11 Ion Preasca, “Blockade and Effects”, Moldova Azi, 10 
August 2004 (retrieved from http://www.azi.md).  
12 See Andrew Beatty, “EU-Russia Pact can Melt ‘Frozen 
Conflicts’ – Foreign Affairs Chief”, European Voice, 12 May 
2005. 
13 Iulia Kirnitki, “Economic Sanctions and Security of the 
Border Between Moldova and Ukraine”, Moldova Azi 
Commentary, 12 April 2005 (retrieved from 
http://www.azi.md/current?ID=33794).  4 |MARIUS VAHL 
 
the problem on the Ukrainian side, in terms of both 
technical equipment and the financial resources to 
implement the new agreements.
14 
All of the measures listed above are now subsumed in the 
framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy, more 
specifically as elements of the ENP Action Plan between 
Moldova and the EU, as well as in the Action Plan 
between Ukraine and the EU. The Action Plan was of 
course negotiated with the government in Chisinau, 
without any consultations with, or input from, the 
‘authorities’ in Tiraspol. The benefits of the ENP – 
increased economic assistance, enhanced cooperation and 
gradual integration – are available almost exclusively to 
the officially recognised Moldova, and as the Action Plan 
is implemented, this will gradually strengthen the position 
of Chisinau. 
Rhetoric and reality in EU policy towards the 
Transnistrian conflict 
There is a clear discrepancy between the EU’s actions and 
its rhetoric relating to the Transnistrian conflict. Officially 
the EU is in favour of keeping the current negotiation 
format and consequently staying outside the formal 
negotiation process. A significant deference to Russia is 
evident in public EU statements emphasising that the EU 
will work cooperatively with Russia. By contrast, its 
opposition to the Kozak memorandum was a clear 
challenge to Russian domination in Transnistria and 
Moldova. Implementation of the Dutch OSCE proposals 
and the withdrawal of Russian forces from Transnistria in 
line with the commitments made by Russia at the OSCE 
summit in 1999 in Istanbul
 would have entailed that the 
EU would replace Russia as the principal external military 
actor in Moldova. 
The EU repeatedly calls on both parties to return to the 
negotiating table, implying that Chisinau and Tiraspol are 
equivalent actors. According to the EU’s critics, this 
bestows unwarranted legitimacy on the unrecognised 
Transnistrian regime. But the EU’s actions imply a clear 
bias towards Chisinau. If fully implemented, EU policies 
to change underlying economic structures and to 
strengthen relations with Moldova would entail the 
imposition of an economic blockade of Transnistria by 
Moldova and Ukraine (strongly supported by the EU). 
This course of action would be combined with EU 
measures to improve the economic situation in Moldova 
west of the Nistru river through the ENP. Neither the visa 
ban nor the customs agreement endears the EU to the 
leadership in Tiraspol or burnishes the EU’s credentials as 
a potentially impartial and unbiased mediator between 
Chisinau and the Transnistrian leadership. Indeed, by EU 
standards, its policy has been remarkably proactive and 
indeed quite 
                                                      
14 Comment by Ukrainian Vice Prime Minister Oleh Rybachuk 
at the European Policy Centre breakfast meeting, Brussels, 21 
April 2005.  
aggressive, and has been an important contributing factor 
in widening a growing rift with its largest neighbour and 
‘strategic partner’ Russia.  
What’s next? 
The growing role of the EU has already had a profound 
impact on the prospects and shape of an eventual 
settlement. First, given the consensus in Moldova on the 
long-term goal of EU membership, Chisinau is unlikely to 
accept any deal without explicit EU support. This gives 
the EU a de facto veto on any proposals for a 
constitutional settlement of the Transnistrian conflict. 
Second, it is equally clear that the EU will be a, and most 
likely  the, dominant external actor in any post-conflict 
settlement.  
So what are the next steps of this apparent EU strategy 
towards a settlement? It is argued here that it is now time 
for the EU to develop and articulate its position on several 
possible developments that it has contributed greatly to 
unleash. This applies in particular to issues such as the 
EU’s response if the attempted blockade is successful and 
the Transnistrian economy collapses, its position on 
Moldova’s repeated requests for expanding the 
negotiation format to include the EU and other external 
actors, its view on the substance of an acceptable 
constitutional settlement and on the role of the EU and 
other external actors in a post-conflict settlement. Some 
sort of plan is also needed as to how to avoid a serious 
worsening in relations with Russia, which could all-to-
easily result if current EU policies run their course and 
Russia’s position on these issues remains unchanged. 
A new negotiation format?  
The first of these new realities has a direct bearing on 
efforts to find a negotiated settlement of the conflict. The 
last few years have witnessed a growing disenchantment 
with the existing negotiation framework, although there is 
no consensus on a new format. While there have been 
intermittent meetings in the 2+3 format (with Russia, 
Ukraine and the OSCE) since late 2003, real negotiations 
were effectively ended following the debacle over the 
Kozak memorandum. In the wake of the school crisis in 
the summer of 2004, President Voronin declared an end to 
negotiations with Tiraspol.
15 
As an expression of Moldova’s profound shift in foreign 
policy orientation under the Communist government, 
President Voronin has since been acting to change the 
official negotiating format. His first initiative was the 
February 2003 proposal to establish the Joint 
Constitutional Commission, in which the EU participated 
                                                      
15 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Moldova Ends 
negotiations with Renegade Region”, feature article, 27 August 
2004. Moldova would from then on only speak “with those 
whom Tiraspol obeys in the most direct way”. (Retrieved from 
http://www.rferl.org). THE EUROPEANISATION OF THE TRANSNISTRIAN CONFLICT| 5 
as an observer. In September this was followed by Mr 
Voronin inviting the EU to join as a mediator in the 
negotiations, an invitation extended in numerous speeches 
by the Moldovan leadership since then.
16 In June 2004, 
President Voronin proposed a Stability and Security Pact 
for Moldova to be endorsed by the current mediators as 
well as the EU, the US and Romania.
17  
Mr Voronin has considerable support for a new 
negotiating framework in Moldova, as the political 
opposition are highly critical of the current format, which 
is said to be dominated by Russia and thus favours 
Tiraspol over Chisinau. A recent proposal from prominent 
Moldovan experts called for a new 3+3 format to replace 
the existing 2+3 format, which would exclude the 
Transnistrian authorities and include the EU, the US and 
Romania.
18 The recently elected Moldovan parliament 
adopted a Declaration on 24 March calling for the 
involvement of the US, the EU and Romania in the 
negotiations.
19 
Among these three potential mediators, Romania has been 
most open towards direct participation in the negotiations. 
Indeed, the new Romanian President Basescu recently 
called for Romania to be included in diplomatic efforts to 
resolve the Transnistrian conflict.
20 Both the EU and the 
US have remained officially committed to the existing 
format. The US has played a backseat role as the EU has 
become increasingly engaged in Moldova. There have, 
however, been important instances of ‘blatant 
transatlantic cooperation’ over Moldova and the 
Transnistrian conflict, seen most visibly with the 
simultaneous imposition of visa bans and coordinated 
pressure on Russia to abide by its OSCE commitments to 
withdraw its forces from Transnsitria.  
All of the three current mediators are in favour of keeping 
the existing 2+3 format. Russia has reacted negatively to 
suggestions that the EU or other external actors should be 
included as mediators. Nevertheless, it seems legitimate 
to question Russia’s commitment to the existing format 
following the late 2003 debacle over the Kozak 
memorandum, a unilateral Russian initiative developed 
without the participation or even the knowledge of the 
                                                      
16 Speech by President Voronin at a Council of Europe 
conference on frozen conflicts, Chisinau, September 2003.  
17 George Dura, “Voronin’s Stability and Security Pact – Yet 
Another Balancing Act?”, September 2004 (retrieved from 
http://www.eurojournal.org).  
18 Oazu Nantoi, Igor Munteanu and Vlad Spanu, The 3D 
Strategy and Action Plan for the Settlement of the Transnistrian 
Conflict, The Moldova Foundation, Arlington, VA, September 
2004 (retrieved from http://foundation.moldova.org 
/pagini/eng/125).   
19 Moldovan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, European Newsletter, 
No. 2 (retrieved from http://www.eurojournal.org).  
20 Interview with Mr Basescu by Radio Free Europe “Romania: 
President Seeks Participation in Transnsitria Talks, 
Multinational Black Sea Task Force”, Radio Free Europe/Radio 
Liberty, 19 February 2005. 
other designated mediators, the OSCE and Ukraine. Until 
the Orange Revolution, Ukraine was also in favour of 
keeping the existing negotiating format. Although the new 
government officially supports this position, it is not 
against enlarging the group of mediators to also include 
the EU, the US and Romania.
21  
The OSCE and its mission in Moldova have also 
remained committed to the existing format. The current 
crisis in the OSCE is important in any discussion of the 
appropriate negotiation format for the Transnistrian 
conflict, which itself may have an impact on the prospects 
of a solution to the problems currently facing the OSCE. 
If the crisis becomes prolonged and this prevents the 
OSCE from playing an active role in the negotiations, this 
would seem to favour a new format. On the other hand, it 
would be difficult not to view attempts to create a new 
format during the OSCE crisis as an exercise to 
undermine the OSCE as such. None of the actors involved 
are, ultimately, likely to agree to this.  
Preparing for the collapse of the Transnistrian 
economy? 
If the EU’s policy of engagement in the Transnsitrian 
conflict is successful and the Union together with 
Moldova is able to solicit support from Ukraine, it will 
sharply reduce the revenues on which the Transnistrian 
regime depends. The fragile and already troubled 
Transnistrian economy may indeed collapse. This raises 
the question as to whether any EU measures are 
envisaged for this quite likely eventuality.  
This is strongly related to the question of how far will 
Russia go in supporting the Transnistrian regime, the 
leaders of which are all Russian citizens (as are 100,000 
persons among the 600,000 population of the secessionist 
entity). Russia currently provides considerable economic 
life support to the Transnistrian regime, primarily through 
energy supplies on credit. Russia could surely afford to 
support the small region indefinitely, but such a scenario 
would put Russia and the EU into a situation of working 
directly against each other, hardly in line with the joint 
aspirations for a ‘common space on external security’. 
A significant worsening of an already precarious 
economic situation in Transnistria is likely to raise the 
question of the fate of the self-appointed leadership of 
Transnistria, currently banned from going to the EU and 
the US, in a post-conflict settlement. Without the 
leadership, in charge of running two-thirds of the 
economy (including most of the important companies), 
the Transnistrian economy could disintegrate and be faced 
with a humanitarian crisis. Much of the political class in 
                                                      
21 Joint Declaration of 1 March 2005, see Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty 3 February 2005 (retrieved from 
http://www.rferl.org), and European Newsletter, No. 2, 
Moldovan Ministry of Foreign Affairs (retrieved from 
http://www.eurojournal.org).  6 |MARIUS VAHL 
 
Chisinau would like to see the current Transnistrian 
leadership put on trial and eventually sent to prison.  
The contours of a settlement? 
The two latest proposals from the mediators, the Kyiv 
document of July 2002 and the Kozak memorandum of 
November 2003, both called for the creation of a 
Moldovan federation. Ukraine and Georgia were to make 
joint proposals for a settlement at the GUAM (Georgia, 
Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova) summit on 22 April 
2005 in Chisinau, supposedly suggesting the creation of a 
federation, which remains the favoured model for Russia 
and the leadership in Transnistria. President Voronin 
stated recently however that the government in Chisinau 
will not even consider any federalisation plans, calling for 
the direct involvement of the US, the EU and Romania in 
the negotiations. A bill on a special autonomy status for 
Transnistria under the 1994 Moldovan Constitution is 
currently being developed by the Voronin government.
22 
The typical response from EU officials concerning 
proposals for a constitutional settlement is that the labels, 
be they ‘autonomy’, (‘asymmetric’ or ‘symmetric’) 
‘federation’, ‘confederation’ or ‘common state’, are of 
secondary importance, and that what matters is the 
substantial division of competences. Nevertheless, EU 
officials frequently refer in vague terms to previous 
proposals, which sows doubts about the EU’s position or 
indeed whether it has one. During his meeting with 
President Putin in early April 2005, for instance, High 
Representative Solana ostensibly stated that parts of the 
Kozak memo were “highly appreciated”.
23 EU Special 
Representative Jacobovits recently spoke in favour of 
providing Transnsitria with “far-reaching autonomy” 
based on European models, stating that previous 
proposals such as the 2002 Kyiv document on a 
federation and the 2003 Russian-OSCE mediators’ paper 
(which was never published owing to the debacle over the 
Kozak memorandum), contained valuable parts and could 
be used as a basis for further negotiations.
24 
In light of the EU’s growing role in the region and its de 
facto veto on any constitutional settlement, the lack of a 
clear position and the absence of the EU around the 
negotiating table is liable to become an increasingly 
prominent constraint on the negotiating process. A clear 
and consistent EU position would presumably be 
appreciated by the other parties involved.  
                                                      
22 See the Moldova Azi website (http://www.azi.md), 13 April 
2005 with reference to the interview with Mr Voronin on 
Moldovan television on 12 April 2005.  
23 Vladimir Socor, “Call Me Javier?”, Eurasia Daily Monitor, 
Vol. 2, Issue 70, 11 April 2005.  
24 Vladmir Socor, “EU policy disarray in Georgia and 
Moldova”, Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 2, Issue 74, 15 April 
2005. 
Europeanising Moldova and Transnistria 
While the Communist government did not turn Moldova 
into a ‘European Cuba’, as promised by Mr Voronin 
during the 2001 election campaign and has backed down 
from some of the more dubious and repressive policies 
espoused at the beginning of his first term, its 
commitment to Europeanisation remains largely 
declaratory. The initiative to change this must ultimately 
come from Moldova itself. The broad consensus on 
Moldova’s ‘European choice’ and the promising 
cooperative spirit seen following the parliamentary 
elections in March 2005 augurs well on this score.  
Whether or not the Communist government is able to 
deliver on its promises of political and economic reforms 
will largely affect the prospects of a settlement of the 
Transnistrian conflict. The problems are severe and the 
challenges facing the government are daunting. While this 
poorest country in Europe has seen impressive economic 
growth rates in recent years, this is largely the result of an 
increase in remittances from the large number of 
Moldovans working abroad, most of them either in the 
EU or in Russia, and many of them illegally. The country 
lacks basic infrastructure such as paved roads in large 
areas of the country. Subsistence farming and the barter of 
basic staples has become the means of survival for a large 
share of the people remaining in Moldova.  
A lot of traditional development assistance is thus needed 
in the impoverished Moldova, to a greater extent than 
other transition economies in Eastern Europe. This should 
be reflected in EU assistance policy to the country as the 
European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument is 
developed. Moldova and the EU could also consider 
whether it could be possible to engage with the people of 
Transnistria, for instance through participation in less 
politicised areas such as research and education, and 
through establishing people-to-people contacts by 
engaging with the small Transnistrian private sector and 
its few NGO’s.  
In operational terms, the ENP is primarily bilateral and 
not related to the enlargement process. The EU would do 
well to consider how to avoid some of the problems seen 
in the 2004 enlargement as regards movements across the 
new border of the enlarged Union when Romania accedes 
in 2007. This could include studies on whether special 
visa arrangements for border regions such as exist 
between Slovakia and Ukraine or asymmetric visa 
arrangements such as that between Ukraine and Poland 
could be considered in Romanian-Moldovan relations. 
The trilateral dialogue between the EU, Moldova and 
Ukraine on customs and border controls could be 
broadened to include consultations and the exchange of 
information on all aspects of the ENP to avoid possible 
complications from an unsynchronised development of 
EU-Moldovan and EU-Ukrainian relations.  
The first proposals from the Yuschenko government 
presented at the GUAM summit in late April 2005 is a 
case in point. The tentative Ukrainian ‘plan’ for THE EUROPEANISATION OF THE TRANSNISTRIAN CONFLICT| 7 
Transnistria was widely criticised by Ukrainian and 
international experts as well as by Moldovan officials.
25 If 
implemented, the proposals would bestow unwarranted 
legitimacy and power to the current regime in Tiraspol, 
giving them a de facto veto on Moldovan foreign policy. 
The calls for early elections in Transnistria are 
implausible in light of the political situation in the region. 
Furthermore, the Ukrainian proposals do not adequately 
address Moldovan concerns about the lack of Western 
participation as mediators and eventual guarantors, calling 
for a treaty of guarantee with the current mediators as 
signatories. An extension of the trilateral dialogue to 
include the Transnistrian conflict more directly as well 
could perhaps prevent such incidents in the future.   
An irresistible force and an immovable object?  
The developments analysed above seem to indicate a 
movement towards a clash between the irresistible force 
of Europeanisation of the Transnistrian conflict and the 
immovable object of a continued Russian presence in the 
region. This is likely to be the biggest challenge for the 
EU and its policy towards Moldova and the Transnistrian 
conflict in coming months and years. 
Relations between Russia and Moldova have 
progressively deteriorated during the presidencies of 
Messrs Putin and Voronin. Moldovan high officials 
increasingly refer to Russian peacekeepers as ‘occupiers’, 
while Russia has threatened to increase prices for natural 
gas supplies to Moldova, on which the country is highly 
dependent, and to impose economic sanctions on 
Moldovan imports in March 2005. Indeed, on 18 April, 
meat imports from Moldova were banned.  
                                                      
25 See for instance Oleksandr Sushko, “Security via Democracy: 
A Transnistria Version”, Ukrainian Monitor, No. 10, 24 April 
2005; see also Vladimir Socor, “Porochenko Drafts, Yuschenko 
Launches Plan for Transnistria”, Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 2, 
Issue 82, 27 April 2005; and “Porochenko Adopts Primakov’s 
Concept for Transnistria Settlement”, Eurasia Daily Monitor, 
Vol. 2, Issue 96, 17 May 2005. 
How far is the EU willing to go in terms of a deteriorating 
relationship with Russia as the price of its lop-sided 
engagement with the parties of the conflict? Considering 
the willingness of the EU and perhaps of some of the 
larger member states in particular to sacrifice basic 
European values in order to facilitate a rapprochement 
with Russia, one should perhaps not be too optimistic 
concerning a clear EU position adhered to by all its 
member states in case some of the more dramatic 
scenarios described above come to pass. The manner in 
which the question of frozen conflicts was virtually erased 
from the road map on a common space of external 
security agreed at the EU-Russian summit on 10 May 
gives further support for a rather pessimistic view on this 
issue.  
But one may on the other hand also question whether 
Russia’s position is as clear as the above may indicate. 
Although both the rhetoric and policy actions of Russia 
vis-à-vis Moldova have hardened over the last few 
months, a greater willingness to at least discuss the matter 
with the EU and listen to the EU’s ideas on the matter 
also materialised during the first months of 2005. The EU 
should take up Russia on this offer. One area where 
compromise could be possible concerns the post-
settlement external military presence. This is likely to be a 
modest force of limited duration and its significance is 
primarily symbolic. Yet it matters more to Russia and the 
EU. Allowing for a continued Russian presence could be 
a price even hard-line Moldovans could accept in return 
for an end to the Transnistrian conflict and the 
Europeanisation of a united Moldova.  
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